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Using the theoretical predictions of the Bernanke-Blinder (1988) model, we seek to 
examine the existence of a bank lending channel through the empirical identification of a 
loan supply function and to assess the impact of differential bank characteristics on 
banks’ ability to supply loans. To this end, we estimate a loan supply model and test for 
the restrictions implied by perfect substitutability between loans and bonds in bank 
portfolios. Estimations are carried out on bank panel data for 16 OECD countries, the 
results showing that a bank lending channel is at work in only two of them. Moreover, 
and contrary to standard accounts, we find that the relevance of bank characteristics is 
hardly a decisive factor in the identification of a loan supply function.   
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1. Introduction 
  The monetary transmission mechanism holds a central position in monetary 
analysis and has quite justifiably attracted a large amount of research. A still 
controversial issue in this respect is the relative importance of the “money” and “credit” 
channels of monetary transmission. Supporters of the traditional money view argue that 
the focus on interest rates or monetary aggregates is sufficient for understanding the 
transmission of monetary policy.  The explanation runs as follows: in a world of two 
assets, money and bonds, a decline in bank reserves causes the real interest rate to rise.  
Investment demand and (interest-sensitive) consumer demand start to fall and, ultimately, 
real output decreases. Policymakers have followed this conventional view for many 
decades.  However, some relatively recent events (for instance, the credit crunch during 
the 1990-91 recession in the United States)
1 have shown that the interest rate channel 
alone may not explain the monetary transmission mechanism.   
  While agreeing with the broad outlines of standard theory, Bernanke and Blinder 
(1988) and Bernanke and Gertler (1995), among other proponents of the credit view, 
emphasize the role of financial intermediaries and agency costs in monetary transmission. 
In particular, they suggest that output changes cannot be solely explained by changes in 
interest rates, which are small and, in any case, transitory. They therefore add a “balance 
sheet” channel and a “bank lending” channel to the theoretical discussion. The former 
suggests that the rise in interest rates following a contractionary monetary policy causes a 
deterioration in borrowers’ balance sheets, which in turn raises the cost of credit 
intermediation and the requirement of additional collateral. The underlying theory of the 
bank lending channel suggests that firms have few substitute sources of funds beyond 
bank borrowing. Since during periods of monetary contraction the liabilities of banking 
institutions decrease, borrowers bear a large portion of the contraction. As noted by 
Bernanke (1993), the basic assumption needed for the existence of a bank lending 
channel is that, due to financial market imperfections, bonds and loans are imperfect 
substitutes for firms and banks do not consider loans as perfect substitutes for securities 
                                                 
1 Peek and Rosengren (1995) point out that the slower than expected US recovery from the 1990-91 
recession was accompanied by slow growth in bank lending.   6
in their portfolios. If this holds, central bank actions might affect the supply of loans from 
banks and, in turn, real spending in the economy.    
While the balance sheet channel appears reasonably well established, the 
existence of a bank lending channel is still debated. Bernanke and Blinder (1988) 
developed a simple model (BB model hereafter) for the bank lending channel, which 
became the benchmark for future studies – and is practically the only structural 
framework available.  They expanded the conventional IS-LM model to include the loan 
market, dropping the assumption of perfect substitutability between bank loans and 
securities (bonds). In this framework, loan supply shifts play a key role in the propagation 
of monetary impulses, amplifying the effect that works through the interest rate channel. 
Yet, observed changes in the quantity of loans after a monetary policy movement need 
not be related only to loan supply shifts but can also be interpreted differently. Thus, a 
monetary contraction may depress aggregate demand through the interest rate channel, 
thereby decreasing the demand for bank loans. The difficulties in distinguishing shifts in 
loan demand from shifts in loan supply (identification or simultaneity problem) have 
prompted researchers to focus on cross section (bank-level) data and try to capture 
asymmetries in loan supply behavior by examining reduced-form equations linking bank 
loans to monetary policy measures (see for example Kashyap and Stein, 2000). Implicit 
in this approach is the assumption that when asymmetries are present, loan supply shifts – 
a necessary condition for the operation of the lending channel – may be identified.  
In this paper we focus on the loan market in the BB model and propose the direct 
identification of the loan supply function from bank-level data, while in a second step we 
assess the impact of differential balance sheet characteristics on banks’ ability to supply 
loans. To this end, we test appropriate restrictions that are valid when perfect 
substitutability exists between loans and bonds in bank portfolios. This novel empirical 
test of the BB model is applied to a number of panel datasets corresponding to 16 OECD 
countries for the years 1996 to 2003. In the empirical analysis we deal with a number of 
econometric problems posed by the use of bank-level data, and this helps us to increase 
the robustness of the results pertaining to the existence of the bank lending channel.   7
  Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes some previous empirical 
studies on the bank lending channel. The model specification is described in Section 3, 
and in Section 4 we present the empirical methodology and results. Our paper is 
concluded in Section 5.     
 
2. Brief literature review 
  The Bernanke-Blinder (1988) model introduces a separate channel of monetary 
transmission, the bank lending channel, whose operation enhances the interest-rate-
induced effect of monetary policy on aggregate demand. In this model, the bank lending 
channel is not operative when both loan demand and loan supply are perfectly elastic 
with respect to the loan rate and output demand is not responsive to changes in the loan 
rate; if these conditions hold, the demand for (supply of) loans cannot be defined 
separately from the demand for (supply of) securities.  
  To test for the existence of a bank lending channel, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) 
applied VAR analysis to US data to examine impulse responses of loans, deposits, 
securities and unemployment following a contractionary monetary policy. Their results 
showed that in the short run the volume of securities and deposits declines, while the 
effect on loans is not as important. Over a longer period of time, however, bank loans are 
substantially reduced, as banks are reluctant to make new contracts when the old ones 
expire. The effect on unemployment was found to be very similar to the effect on loans 
and therefore Bernanke and Blinder suggested that their analysis provides evidence for 
both a bank lending and an interest rate channel.  
  There has been a number of further attempts to test the implications of the 
Bernanke-Blinder model. Kashyap et al. (1993) examined changes in the mix between 
bank loans and commercial paper following monetary policy shocks. They asserted that if 
a bank lending channel exists, a monetary contraction will reduce the supply of bank 
credit. Therefore, an increase in non-bank debt could be expected due to the ability of 
some firms to substitute between the two sources of funds, leading to a decrease in the 
share of bank loans in total external finance. Their empirical results based on US   8
manufacturing data over the period 1963 to 1989 confirm this, indicating that a 
contractionary policy can reduce loan supply. 
  Oliner and Rudebusch (1995) pointed out that Kashyap et al. (1993) used a 
narrow measure of the finance mix, which may exclude important shifts in financing 
patterns after a change in monetary policy.  Thus, they adopted a broader definition of 
non-bank debt to analyze the response of the debt mix to monetary shocks. Their 
empirical results, once again based on US manufacturing data, provide no evidence for a 
bank lending channel. However, Oliner and Rudebusch identified important differences 
in the behavior of small and large firms.  
  A common characteristic of these contributions is that they estimated time series 
relationships, concentrating on relatively short-term responses of loan supply, which may 
not be very informative in view of the fact that banks are prevented from quickly 
adjusting the stock of their loans following a monetary policy shock, due to loan 
commitments and other contractual agreements (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992). Also, 
observed responses may admit alternative interpretations, not necessarily restricted to 
loan supply shifts, but involving shifts in both loan demand and loan supply.     
  The difficulties in distinguishing shifts in loan demand from shifts in loan supply 
have prompted researchers to focus on panel data in order to indirectly test for the 
existence of a loan supply function by looking at the importance of bank characteristics 
for individual bank lending following a monetary policy change. Studies in this group 
include Kashyap and Stein (2000) and Kishan and Opiela (2000), both examining the US 
case. The former study uses liquidity and size to find evidence of a bank lending channel 
(which is stronger for smaller banks), while the latter uses an additional bank 
characteristic (namely bank capitalization) and suggests that the smaller and least 
capitalized banks are the most responsive to a monetary policy change. In contrast, large 
banks can partly, if not completely, insulate their loans from the effects of monetary 
policy, which implies that a bank lending channel may not hold in total, as these banks 
account for about 80% of all loans in the industry.     
Studies that tested for the existence of a bank lending channel across European 
countries are Bondt (1999), Favero et al. (1999), Altunbas et al. (2002) and Ehrmann et   9
al. (2003), while a number of studies examined the lending channel for individual 
countries (see for example the relevant studies in Angeloni et al. (2003) for euro area 
countries, Gambacorta (2005) for Italy and Kakes and Sturm (2002) for Germany). The 
results from these studies are rather inconclusive, generally suggesting that a bank 
lending channel is effective in countries with banking systems characterized by high 
dependency on small banks, weak capitalization and liquidity and limited non-bank 
sources of funds. 
The panel studies mentioned above relied on reduced-form equations, linking 
bank loans to monetary policy measures. Even though this approach offers an insight into 
the effect of differential bank characteristics on bank lending, it appears to have basically 
two limitations. First, it does not allow the identification of the structural parameters that 
are relevant for the existence of a bank lending channel, in particular the interest rate 
elasticity of loan supply. Yet, identification of a loan supply function is critical to the 
empirical investigation, since in the absence of a bank lending channel, the loan supply 
function cannot be defined. Second, for the estimation of this type of models, simple 
panel data techniques, such as least squares or instrumental variables methods, are 
generally used, which produce significant biases in unknown magnitudes and directions.
2 
The recent econometric literature (e.g. Arellano, 2003) proposes the application of certain 
techniques that overcome problems associated with the dynamic nature and/or the non-
stationarity of the variables regularly used in these models. This issue will be further 
discussed in Section 4. 
  More recently, Brissimis and Magginas (2005), building on the Bernanke-Blinder 
model, proposed a new method for analyzing empirically the bank lending channel. In 
particular, they identified the equilibrium relationships included in the Bernanke-Blinder 
model from a Vector Error Correction Model and tested appropriate restrictions that hold 
under perfect asset substitutability. The use of time series data on six major industrial 
countries suggests that as financial systems move towards a more market-based structure, 
                                                 
2 This might be especially true if the variables used are not stationary, which is usually the case with bank 
balance sheet variables, such as loans, liquid assets and deposits, or if the time dimension of the panels is 
small.    10
bank lending tends to play a less important role in the transmission of monetary policy.
3 
What stands as a challenge is the direct estimation of the loan supply function using 
bank-level data, which has two main advantages: it overcomes the simultaneity problem 
and provides the basis for assessing whether differential bank characteristics are 
important for loan supply identification.       
 
3. Theoretical framework 
  In this section, we try to make progress on the difficult identification problem 
discussed above, by examining loan supply behavior from bank-level data. The proposed 
specification of the loan supply function retains the basic features of the Bernanke-
Blinder (1988) model as regards the loan market. As a supplementary specification test, 
we assess the impact of differential balance sheet characteristics on banks’ ability to 
supply loans, an approach widely used in the empirical literature of the bank lending 
channel that focuses on bank-level data to identify loan supply shifts.    
In the Bernanke-Blinder framework, bank credit has an independent effect on 
monetary transmission if loans and bonds are imperfect substitutes, due to financial 
market imperfections. Assuming, as in the BB model, a competitive market of loans, the 
aggregate loan demand and supply functions can be expressed as follows: 
(, ,)
d
tt t t L Li y ρ
−++
=                                 (1) 
(, , )
s
tt t t L Li D ρ
+− +
=                          (2)  
where L are loans, D are deposits,  ρ  is the bank lending rate, i is the bond rate, y is 
output, and the superscripts d and s refer to loan demand and supply, respectively; all 
variables are in real terms. Output and deposits are the scale variables in equations (1) 
and (2). The presence of the loan rate and the bond rate in both the loan demand and the 
loan supply functions reflects the assumption of imperfect substitutability between loans 
                                                 
3 An important exception is Japan, for which the channel is operative.    11
and bonds in bank portfolios and as sources of external finance for firms. Equilibrium in 
the loan market requires 
ds L L = . 
The use of bank-level data can offer a solution to the simultaneity problem 
inherent in eqs. (1) and (2). Indeed, once the aggregate market for loans, as described by 
these equations, has determined the interest rate for a given period, individual banks can 
be considered as price takers for this period, facing the following equilibrium loan supply 
function, assumed to be linear for analytical convenience: 
()
s
it t t it L iD α βρ γ =+ −+                         (3) 
where ρ is the loan rate as determined in the market for loans. The assumption underlying 
the inclusion of the spread in eq. (3) is that investment decisions of banks are 
characterized by rate of return homogeneity of degree zero, which implies that, when 
rates of return rise by the same amount for all assets, banks do not alter the structure of 
their balance sheets. 
Identification of the loan supply function is a critical condition in the BB model 
that must be satisfied for a bank lending channel to exist (as mentioned in Section 2 
above and in BB), because for an inoperative lending channel it is sufficient that loans 
and bonds are perfect substitutes for either borrowers or banks. If financial markets are 
characterized by asymmetric information, the effect of monetary policy through the 
interest rate channel can be amplified by changes in the availability of internal cash flow 
or of external finance. When banks are the main providers of funds for households or 
firms, monetary policy could affect the latters’ spending via shifts in loan supply. A 
second argument favoring direct estimation of the bank loan supply function is that 
estimation of reduced-form equations linking bank loans to monetary policy variables 
does not allow identification of the parameters of the structural model. Since, due to data 
limitations, the observed asymmetries cannot be explicitly linked to the output responses 
of firms that borrow from a particular size category of banks, their implications for 
aggregate economic activity and the transmission mechanism are not clearly visible (see 
Kashyap and Stein, 2000).    12
When banks view loans and bonds as perfect substitutes () β →∞ , the loan and 
bond rates are equalized and 
s
it L  is not defined. Given that we cannot directly test that 
β →∞, we invert eq. (3) to obtain: 
/( 1 / )( / ) t t it it iL D ρ αβ β γβ −= − + −                                  (4)   
This specification allows for the identification of the parameters of the loan supply 
function. Rejection of the joint significance of the variables in the right-hand side would 
provide evidence against the existence of a bank lending channel, since loan supply 
would be perfectly elastic with respect to the interest rate spread.   
Implications of the bank lending channel are, inter alia, that monetary policy has 
distributional effects for banks. Monetary policy is thus expected to have a differentiated 
impact on the loans of individual banks, depending on certain bank characteristics. If we 
assume that loan demand is homogeneous across banks with respect to these 
characteristics, the differentiated loan responsiveness to monetary policy impulses would 
help identify loan supply movements. We introduce the effect of bank characteristics via 
the coefficient on deposits, which implies that 
01 it Z γ γγ =+                          ( 5 )  
where  it Z  is a bank-specific characteristic.
4 Substituting (5) into (4) yields: 
01 /( 1 / )( / ) ( / ) t t it it it it iL D D Z ρ αβ β γ β γ β −= − + − −                 (6) 
In line with previous studies, the bank-specific characteristics used here are size, 
capitalization and liquidity, each expected to have a negative effect on the supply of loans 
( 1 0 γ < ). Well-capitalized and liquid banks should be able to better shield their loans 
from monetary policy changes by resorting to the higher amount of stockholders’ funds 
available and by using their buffer of liquid assets. Also, larger banks tend to raise less 
expensive capital, which may lead to a better lending position. If these effects are 
significant, the shift parameter γ  would be smaller and, as a result, the lending channel 
would be less important. Again in eq. (6) testing for the joint significance of the right-
                                                 
4 This is equivalent to including as regressors both the level of deposits and an interaction term between   13
hand side variables gives an indication of the importance of the lending channel. In the 
following section, we provide estimates of eqs. (4) and (6) for a sample of OECD 
countries.   
 
4. Empirical evidence 
4.1 Data and econometric methodology  
In this section we investigate the existence of a loan supply function, which in the 
BB model is a prerequisite for the operation of a bank lending channel, by using panel 
data on banks for 16 OECD countries. The panels for individual countries are unbalanced 
and include yearly observations for the period 1996-2003. All bank balance sheet 
variables are obtained from the BankScope database and deflated by the consumer price 
index. Loans and deposits are expressed in logs. The lending rate and the bond rate are 
drawn from the IFS database.
5 Bank size (S) is measured by the logarithm of total assets, 
liquidity (LQA) by the ratio of liquid assets (cash, deposits held with other banks and 
short-term securities) to total assets and capitalization (CAP) by the ratio of capital and 
reserves to total assets.  In order to get indicators that sum to zero over all observations, 
the bank-characteristic variables are defined as deviations from their cross-sectional mean 
at each time period in the case of the size variable, so as to remove its trend, or the 
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this variable and the bank-specific characteristic.  
5 These are nominal interest rates, since the spread between the two is equal to the real rate spread 
appearing in the theoretical model.   14
In Table 1 we present the number of banks by country and the respective means of the 
variables used. 
We consider the following empirical formulation of eq. (6): 
01 2 3
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         (8) 
where  t R  is the spread between the lending and the bond rate at time t and  t η  is a year-
specific intercept reflecting shocks (e.g. a technology shock) that are common to all 
banks. Of the error components,  i µ  is an unobservable bank-specific effect,  it u  is a 
possibly autoregressive shock and  it ν  is a serially uncorrelated error component. 
In the literature, estimation of lending equations (either reduced-form or 
structural) presents considerable robustness problems due to the non-stationarity of the 
variables involved and the possible existence of cointegrating relationships between 
them.
6 Moreover, in model (8) loans and deposits are likely to be correlated with  i µ ,  it e  
and  it ν , in which case there are no valid moment conditions if the disturbances  it u  are 
autoregressive (Bond, 2002).    
  To overcome these problems we consider a dynamic autoregressive model of the 
kind described in Blundell and Bond (1998) and Arellano (2003): 
 
//
01 12 3 , 14 5 , 16 7 , 1 , 1 t t it i t it i t it it i t i t t it Rdd R d Ld L d Dd D d D Zd DZ η ε −− − − − =+ + + + + + + ++         (9) 
  System GMM can be applied, which does not break down in the presence of unit 
roots (for a proof see Binder et al., 2003). We choose the two-step estimator, since it is 
asymptotically more efficient than the respective one-step estimator, and we account for 
its downward bias by using the finite-sample correction to the two-step covariance matrix 
derived by Windmeijer (2000). The maximum number of instruments that can be used are 
                                                 
6 Binder et al. (2003) and Baltagi (2001), among others, suggest that in panels with a small time dimension 
and a larger cross-sectional dimension (which is usually the case in the relevant literature), instrumental 
variables and GMM estimators based only on standard orthogonality conditions break down if the 
underlying time series contain unit roots.   15
211 , 2 1 , 1 , 2 1 , 1 ,..., , ; ,..., , ; ,..., , tt i t i i t i t i i t R RR L LL D D D −− − − − − ∆∆ ∆  and, when bank characteristics 
are included in the specification,  ,2 ,2 1 1 ,1 ,1 ,..., , it it i i it it DZ D Z D Z − −− − ∆ ∆  too. The choice of the 
lagged levels and lagged first-differences as instruments is made in a way that guarantees 
validity of the resulting overidentifying restrictions, a hypothesis tested using the Hansen 
test, which is the minimized value of the two-step GMM criterion function and – unlike 
the Sargan test in the two-step case – is robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
7  
  The estimation results are shown in Table 2. We present estimates of the inverted 
loan supply function (eq. 4) and an augmented version (eq. 6) that includes the 
capitalization variable. We also estimated equations that include the size and liquidity 
variables separately, as well as equations that include all three bank-characteristic 
variables. However, the results were similar and thus are not reported here.
8  
There are three key considerations in the analysis of our results. First, the Hansen 
test should accept the validity of the lagged levels and lagged first differences as 
instruments. If not, the results are consistent with the presence of measurement errors, 
since the instruments used would be weak. Second, AR(1) could be expected in the first 
differences of the errors because by construction  ,1 it it i t vvv − ∆ =−  should correlate with 
,1 ,1 ,2 it it it vvv −− − ∆=−, as they share the first lag of the error term. However, higher order 
autocorrelation would indicate that some lags of the dependent variable are in fact 
endogenous, thus bad instruments. Therefore, the relevant test statistic should reject the 
presence of AR(2). Third, as noted earlier, the existence of a bank lending channel in the 
BB model presumes that the loan supply function can be defined. To examine this 
hypothesis we use a simple Wald test, which is reported in the last column of Table 2. 
Rejection of the null hypothesis of the joint non-significance of all the right-hand side 
variables of eq. 4 (or eq. 6) would imply perfect substitutability between loans and bonds 
in bank portfolios, in which case eq. 4 (or eq. 6) reduces to  i ρ = . 
 
                                                 
7 In order to ensure robustness - in the spirit of Bond (2002) - we compared the various consistent GMM 
estimators (differenced GMM and system GMM) to simpler estimators like OLS levels, Within Groups and 
first-differenced Two Stage Least Squares estimators, which are likely to be biased in opposite directions as 
regards the lagged dependent variables in panels with a small time dimension.    16
4.2 Results   
  Backed by Wald test values that strongly reject the hypothesis of zero coefficients 
in the estimation of the inverted loan supply function, the results show that Japan and 
Greece are the only countries, among the 16 included in the sample, that are clearly 
identified as having an operative bank lending channel. For Japan the results are not 
surprising given the prolonged recession and the accompanying banking crisis that 
characterized the 1990s, and the exposure to the Asian financial crisis in 1997. The real 
value of bank assets fell, making banks more reluctant to grant new loans for investment. 
This development forced Japanese banks to re-balance their portfolios by shifting from 
loans to bonds. Yet, the nature and depth of the crisis made this adjustment slow, 
reflecting imperfect asset substitutability. Moreover, the importance of financial 
intermediaries in Japan remains high as the share of private sector holdings of financial 
assets in banks accounted in 2000 for 85% of total intermediated financial assets in 
Japan, compared to 63% in the euro area and only 48% in the US (ECB, 2002). 
  The case of Greece is slightly different, as its financial system has only recently 
been fully deregulated and banks during most of the sample period were not able to 
flexibly adjust their portfolios.
9 The results of the present paper are similar to the 
empirical findings of Brissimis et al. (2003) and in line with the conclusions of Kashyap 
and Stein (1997). In the latter study, Greece is classified as a country where the bank 
lending channel is more likely to work, mainly because of the relatively small size of 
Greek banks and the limited availability of non-bank finance. The liberalization of the 
financial system in Greece started much later compared to the rest of EU-15 countries, 
therefore Greece provides an interesting case study for the years ahead. 
  For three countries, namely Spain, Italy and France, our evidence for a bank 
lending channel is weak, since for all of them the restrictions are rejected at the 5 percent 
but not at the 10 percent level of significance. A number of studies that employ reduced-
form equations have examined the French case, their evidence being rather inconclusive. 
                                                                                                                                                 
8 These results are available upon request. 
9 This was mainly due to the high reserve requirement ratio in place until June 2000 when it was 
harmonized with that of the Eurosystem. Notably, the bulk of deposits in foreign currencies were subject to 
a reserve requirement which was effectively 100 per cent.        17
Ehrmann et al. (2003) and Altunbas et al. (2002) suggest that a bank lending channel is 
not operative in general, while Loupias et al. (2003) indicate that its operation is found to 
be conditional on the inclusion in their model of the bank characteristic of liquidity. Here, 
we confirm the results of Brissimis and Magginas (2005), suggesting that overall the 
lending channel in France has recently lost its potency. However, as the relevant 
equations show, inclusion of a bank-characteristic variable significantly reduces the p-
value of the Wald test, bringing it closer to the 5 percent level of significance. This is 
possibly due to the relatively low level of bank health in the late 1990s (see Kashyap and 
Stein, 1997). 
  Many studies have examined the bank lending channel in Italy, too, a recent one 
being Gambacorta (2005). Although we share some of the conclusions of this study 
(especially those regarding comparisons with estimates derived from BankScope data), 
our results are more in line with Altunbas et al. (2002), Favero et al. (1999), Bondt (1999) 
and Brissimis and Magginas (2005), where only weak evidence is found for a lending 
channel.
10 Weak evidence (though stronger compared to France and Italy) is also found 
for a lending channel in Spain.
11 Spain, managed to liberalize its banking sector sooner 
than other Southern European countries, mainly owing to the fact that the Bank of Spain 
has been independent since the late 1970s. In the years to come, one would expect the 
impact of a lending channel to be further weakened as a result of the ongoing financial 
integration with the EU, the latter resulting in increased availability of market-based 
finance. An interesting question regarding the French, Italian and Spanish cases (which 
cannot be addressed here due to data limitations) is whether (or to what extent) there has 
been a change in the effectiveness of the bank lending channel during the last 10 to 15 
years.      
                                                 
10 In particular the profitability of the Italian banks, as proxied by the return on equity, seems to be the 
lowest among EU countries. Also, Italian banks, through their group structure, control a large share of 
mutual funds, engage in the provision of services otherwise offered by other financial institutions and are 
the major financiers of long-term investments (ECB, 2002).   
11 Hernando and Martinez-Pages (2003), using reduced-form equations, also found weak evidence for an 
operative bank lending channel in the 1990s, claiming that the high levels of liquid asset holdings of 
Spanish banks allowed them to absorb even very significant monetary shocks. Other studies like Altunbas 
et al. (2002) and Favero et al. (1999) suggest that a bank lending channel was at work in Spain during the 
1990s.    18
  The moves towards “Anglo-Saxon” type of financial systems, characterized by 
higher levels of transparency and informational symmetry, has led to a decrease in the 
potency of the bank lending channel in the rest of the EU countries. From these, the lower 
Wald test value is found for Denmark, possibly due to low levels of liquidity and 
capitalization, along with the fact that the Danish banking sector consists of a large 
number of relatively small banks (see Kashyap and Stein, 1997). These effects are 
probably more than offset by the extensive availability of non-bank sources of finance to 
Danish firms, mainly due to the financial integration with the EU and the high level of 
liberalization of the Danish economy.  
In Austria, even though the financial system is primarily bank-based,
12 the 
remarkable internationalization that occurred in the second half of the 1990s, as Austrian 
banks increased their foreign assets and liabilities and vigorously expanded into 
neighboring Central and Eastern Europe, has become a key catalyst for their 
consolidation efforts in order to become more competitive. Owing to the sharp increase in 
other types of business, such as international lending and securitization, the share of loans 
to non-bank residents on banks’ balance sheets has shrunk.     
  Although the Dutch and Belgian financial systems are more concentrated than 
those discussed above (something that may signify a departure from competitive 
behavior),
13 the results are not dissimilar. The relevant Wald tests indicate strong 
rejection of the hypothesis of a lending channel, regardless of the inclusion of bank-
characteristic variables.
14 Profitability ratios and bank health indicators are high in both 
countries,
15 while the reduced importance of deposit funding made banks less sensitive to 
the impact of monetary policy. Furthermore, Dutch and Belgian banks have increased 
                                                 
12 This is also the suggestion of Kaufmann (2003) who finds weak evidence for a bank lending channel in 
Austria, using a reduced-form equation and quarterly data for the period 1990-1998.  
13 Various approaches to measuring competition in banking have been proposed, the most recent literature 
favoring the method developed by Panzar and Rosse (1987). Yet, all these approaches provide estimates of 
banking industry market power and not market power exercised by individual banks, as would be 
appropriate when bank-level data are used. This line of investigation is however beyond the scope of this 
study. 
14 For the Dutch case, De Haan (2003) distinguishes between secured and unsecured bank debt to find 
evidence that the lending channel is operative only for unsecured lending. Garretsen and Swank (1998), 
Van Ees et al. (1999) and Kakes (2000) conclude that the bank lending channel is ineffective in general. In 
Belgium, banks have traditionally held a relatively small percentage of their assets in loans and a large 
percentage in government securities.    19
their activities outside the euro area, which is also likely to have made them less sensitive 
to monetary policy impulses. 
  In contrast to other euro area countries, the German financial system has not 
changed dramatically over the past few decades, mainly because financial liberalization 
in Germany took place very early. Also, the degree of banking competition is strong, with 
a large number of banks facing comparatively low levels of profitability. Moreover, the 
fact that the vast majority of the banks are either savings or co-operative allows them to 
indirectly access the interbank market through their respective large central institutions, 
something that creates sufficient flexibility in times of scarce liquidity (ECB, 2002). This 
favors the argument that a bank lending channel is not at work in Germany, as is clearly 
reflected in the relevant Wald tests.
16     
  Luxembourg and Switzerland provide two distinct cases, due to their unique tax, 
legal and structural conditions. The financial sectors in these countries hold a very large 
portion of total GNP, with banks being capitalized and liquid well above international 
standards. The liberalization reforms in these countries were mainly society-driven 
(originating from both domestic and foreign interest groups) and hence more effective. 
Also, the fact that their financial systems are bank-based does not suggest an important 
role for monetary policy transmission through bank assets, since these economies are 
very open to foreign financial flows.  
In Canada, the banking system is concentrated to the top 6 banks that operate 
nationally, and therefore testing an equilibrium relationship with banks behaving as price 
takers should be treated with caution. Recently, Atta-Mensah and Dib (2003) used a 
dynamic general equilibrium model on time series data to examine the role of bank 
lending in the Canadian monetary transmission mechanism. They found that the response 
of output to monetary policy shocks is amplified when the model incorporates credit 
frictions, thus ruling in favor of the channel’s existence. However, our results are in 
contrast. The high level of liberalization of the Canadian banking system and its 
proximity to the US financial sector, which makes plenty of alternative fund sources 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 Also the increase in banks’ loan portfolios was accompanied by an even larger increase in liquid assets. 
16 Brissimis and Magginas (2005), Altunbas et al. (2002) and Favero et al. (1999) also find no evidence of 
an operative bank lending channel in Germany.    20
available, indicates that to the extent that loan and deposit prices are competitive, no 
lending channel is at work. 
In Sweden, too, the evidence strongly rejects the hypothesis of the existence of a 
loan supply function. In the late 1990s there were a number of regulatory changes in the 
Swedish banking system, aiming at the abolition of reserve requirements and the 
strengthening of its market orientation. Furthermore, the system is characterized by 
transparency and informational symmetry; hence the non-identification of a loan supply 
function does not come as a surprise. 
  We kept the discussion of the UK and US cases last, since their financial market 
structures are the most representative of the Anglo-Saxon type. Their banking systems 
are characterized by low concentration and high efficiency, liberalization, globalization 
and transparency. In a recent paper, Huang (2003) uses a reduced-form equation and a 
panel dataset of UK firms to suggest that a bank lending channel is operative.
17 However, 
the development of market financing and the extensive deregulation of the country’s 
banking system that was completed as early as the 1980s seem to support our finding 
about the non-existence of a bank lending channel. Our results for the UK are backed by 
Wald tests strongly suggesting against the identifiability of a loan supply function.  
  The US financial system is probably the most market-oriented among those 
studied in this paper. As noted previously, with regard to the relative size of traditional 
bank intermediation, as measured by the ratio of holdings of bank-related assets to other 
intermediated assets, the US is below the euro area and Japan. At the same time, loans 
and deposits as a percentage of GDP are twice as high in the euro area relative to the US 
(see Maddaloni and Sorensen, 2005). These figures indicate the importance of banking 
intermediation in the euro area compared with the US. One would therefore expect that 
no bank lending channel is operative in the US, since in most EU countries already 
examined, the evidence is either weak or not present at all. We have already mentioned 
the main findings of the literature on the US bank lending channel (which uses reduced-
                                                 
17 This study employs the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator, which has been found to break down in the 
presence of unit roots, likely to be present in bank-level or firm-level balance sheet data. Estimation of the 
present model using the Arellano-Bond method produces large differences in the results, very similar to 
those found by the Monte Carlo experiments of Blundell and Bond (1998).      21
form equations for loan supply identification), our results being similar to those of Kishan 
and Opiela (2000). Our US dataset includes banks that account for about 80% of the total 
industry’s share, admittedly corresponding to large financial intermediaries. Inclusion of 
any of the bank-characteristic variables does not alter the results, which strongly reject 
the existence of a lending channel. 
  As a final step, we have estimated the same loan supply model for the panel of 
EMU countries included in the present analysis. There is no uniformity regarding the 
nature and importance of financial intermediaries across EMU member states. We 
capture this heterogeneity by including country dummies in the regressions, which are 
found to be statistically significant. Unsurprisingly, given the individual country results, 
the estimations show that the lending channel is not operative in the unified panel of 
EMU countries. This has clear and direct implications for ECB’s monetary policy, since 




  Using bank-level data, this paper attempted the identification of a loan supply 
function as this has important implications in the context of the BB model for the 
existence of a bank lending channel. Previous empirical work on the lending channel 
used either (i) time series data and the theoretical predictions of the Bernanke-Blinder 
(1988) model (but faced a problem of simultaneity between loan supply and loan 
demand), or (ii) panel data on banks and indirectly tested for loan supply shifts through 
estimation of reduced-form equations that examine the relationship between bank 
lending, a monetary policy variable and bank characteristics. Implicit in this latter 
approach is the assumption that when heterogeneity in bank characteristics is present, 
loan supply shifts can be identified. 
  Given the limitations of this approach, we focused here on the direct identification 
of the loan supply function from bank data, adopting the assumptions of the Bernanke-
Blinder model as regards the loan market. Thus, we derived, at the individual bank level, 
a loan supply function that is free of the simultaneity problem and offers testable   22
hypotheses pertaining to imperfect substitutability between loans and bonds in bank 
portfolios. In this context, perfect substitutability implies that a loan supply function 
cannot be defined. In a second step, we assessed the impact of individual bank 
characteristics on banks’ ability to supply loans by augmenting the above model to 
include a number of bank-characteristic variables (capitalization, liquidity and size) and 
examining whether these can modify the test results obtained prior to their inclusion. 
  The proposed methodology was applied to a number of panel datasets 
corresponding to 16 OECD countries for the years 1996 to 2003. Among, the countries 
examined the lending channel clearly plays a significant role only in Japan and Greece. In 
the former case this is mainly attributed to the financial distress of the 1990s, while in the 
latter some recent financial deregulations have not been fully absorbed by banking 
institutions during the sample period. A second group of countries, where only weak 
evidence is found for a lending channel, includes France, Italy and Spain. It would be 
interesting to analyze the case of these countries further by investigating whether the 
potency of the bank lending channel has gradually weakened in the last two decades. The 
apparent absence of a bank lending channel in the rest of the countries in our sample 
suggests that the tendency towards increased market-based finance has strengthened the 
degree of asset substitutability. For countries like the US and the UK, where financial 
systems have been predominantly market-based for a relatively long time, the tests 
strongly rejected the hypothesis of an operative lending channel. Finally, heterogeneity in 
bank characteristics was found to be useful in accounting for loan supply shifts only in 
the case of France, suggesting that it represents a less important element on which the 
search for a bank lending channel could be based.   
We conclude that future research regarding loan supply identification may benefit 
from focusing on the structure, performance and risks facing the banking industry or 
individual banks. This would require a different theoretical framework with 
microeconomic underpinnings to account for possibly inefficient, imperfectly 
competitive, or incomplete banking systems.    23
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Table 1 




















Austria 138  2055.6  981.6  1451.4  13.9  7.8 
Belgium 80  15525.3  6166.9  12917.8  18.4  8.9 
Canada 69  20375.6  10874.5  16869.4  5.8  11.9 
Denmark 77  428.3  283.0  176.4  24.0  14.5 
France 213  4163.1  1480.7  3362.5  16.5  12.2 
Germany 765  4753.0  2408.9  3307.5  28.4  6.7 
Greece 27  7111.5  3070.5  6253.3  29.3  10.4 
Italy 266  9413.8  5242.2  6285.7  25.0  11.6 
Japan 154  485.4  314.0  408.3  13.8  5.2 
Luxembourg 138  4520.6  1010.7  3680.2  44.5  6.2 
Netherlands 64  26793.4  16715.3  19436.7  34.1  9.6 
Spain 159  7247.1  3887.9  5841.5  11.5  12.3 
Sweden 100  8388.6  5468.2  5282.5  13.3  12.1 
Switzerland 413  536.6  328.7  408.5  19.1  13.8 
UK 134  10124.1  3756.1  6923.3  53.3  15.6 
USA 560  12946.9  7655.2  10390.7  7.2  9.1 
EMU countries  2094  6310.7  3045.5  4588.9  27.0  9.3 
Notes: 
a.  The number of banks that operated in each country during the sample period (whether in operation   
throughout the whole period or not). 
b.  The overall mean assets for each country’s panel in million euros. 
c.  The overall mean loans for each country’s panel in million euros. 
d.  The overall mean deposits for each country’s panel in million euros. 
e.  The overall mean liquidity in percentages (liquid assets to total assets ratio) for each country’s panel. 
f.  The overall mean capitalization in percentages (equity to total assets ratio) for each country’s panel.  
  
 Table 2 
Estimation results 
Country Obs.  1 t R −   it L   ,1 it L −   it D   ,1 it D −   () it ZD   ,1 () it ZD −   Hansen 
b AR(1)
 b AR(2)
 b Wald 
b 
Austria 634  0.933  6.561  -6.996  -8.433  8.582    






  634  0.929  6.394  -6.930  -8.719 8.940  -0.103 -0.037 
   (1.52)  (1.24)  (-1.32)  (-1.90)*  (1.89)*  (-0.06)  (-0.02)  0.438 0.022  0.279  0.659 
                   
Belgium 275  0.473  -0.276 0.046  1.094  -1.049    
   (4.18)***  (-0.53)  (0.11)  (1.21)  (-1.25)      0.076 0.000  0.176  0.396 
 275  0.504  -0.033  -0.223  -0.066  0.155  1.623  -1.595 
   (4.16)***  (-0.06)  (-0.40)  (-0.06)  (0.15)  (1.28)  (-1.26)  0.137 0.001  0.190  0.547 
                   
Canada 269  0.277 0.116  0.704 0.593 -1.890     
   (1.60)  (0.24)  (0.81)  (0.97)  (-1.49)      0.230 0.012  0.605  0.163 
  269  0.173  1.305  0.291  -1.091 -1.581 0.617  -3.074 
   (0.79)  (1.68)  (0.31)  (-1.52)  (-1.39)  (0.57)  (-2.73)***  0.451 0.060  0.221  0.118 
                   
Denmark 398 -0.099  3.103  -2.724  3.363  -4.425     
   (-0.32)  (0.85)  (-1.07)  (1.12)  (-2.05)**      0.899 0.071  0.073  0.130 
 398  -0.271  2.008  -1.610  0.488  -1.327  2.001  2.219 
   (-1.13)  (0.89)  (-0.88)  (0.21)  (-0.71)  (1.99)**  (2.06)**  0.935 0.154  0.675  0.103 
                   
France 955  0.076  0.755  0.514 -1.277  0.571     
   (0.28)  (1.28)  (0.79)  (-1.48)  (0.62)      0.112 0.127  0.981  0.154 
  955  -0.152 0.160  0.602  -1.085 1.663  -0.714 1.927 
    (-0.40) (0.22)  (0.75)  (-0.91) (1.25)  (-0.93) (2.38)**  0.907 0.023  0.425  0.064 
                   
Germany 3501  0.011  4.407  -4.562  1.205  -1.812     
   (0.05)  (0.80)  (-0.70)  (0.38)  (-0.33)      0.467 0.283  0.994  0.684 
  3500  -0.039 2.821  -1.987  -0.071 -4.325 -0.537 -2.590 
    (-0.18) (0.69)  (-0.53)  (-0.03) (-1.05) (-0.29) (-0.93) 0.439 0.123  0.571  0.779 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Country Obs.  1 t R −   it L   ,1 it L −   it D   ,1 it D −   () it ZD   ,1 () it ZD −   Hansen 
b AR(1)
 b AR(2)
 b Wald 
b 
Greece 102  0.775  6.904  -7.883  -8.610  8.647     
   (7.18)***  (2.20)**  (-3.36)***  (-2.24)**  (3.10)***     
0.694 0.666  0.033  0.000 
 91  1.120  12.178  -13.582  -14.588  14.786  -0.087  0.668 
    (5.43)*** (3.34)*** (-2.15)**  (-3.45)***  (1.89)*  (-0.13)  (2.96)**  0.750 0.110  0.308  0.008 
                   
Italy  882  0.315  0.595  -0.624  -2.741 -0.482    
   (2.19)**  (0.36)  (-0.43)  (-1.66)  (-0.40)      0.082 0.161  0.076  0.078 
 882  0.281  1.077  0.819  -2.459  0.136  0.710  -0.143 
   (1.27)  (0.73)  (0.45)  (-1.44)  (0.05)  (1.96)**  (-0.33)  0.931 0.768  0.111  0.143 
                   
Japan 702  -0.082  1.553  -2.188  -0.675  0.295     
   (-1.44)  (8.75)***  (-5.33)***  (-3.43)***  (0.70)      0.315 0.030  0.621  0.000 
 702  -0.100  1.424  -1.957  -0.85  0.39  0.107  0.026 
   (-1.63)  (3.78)***  (-4.48)***  (-2.32)**  (1.19)  (1.93)**  (0.20)  0.965 0.037  0.929  0.000 
                   
Luxembourg 528  -0.272  0.217  -0.269  0.240  -0.313     
   (-5.52)***  (1.40)  (-1.45)  (0.71)  (-0.78)      0.696 0.624  0.329  0.532 
  528  -0.317 -0.021 -0.092  1.739  0.554  0.855  0.158 
    (-1.65) (-0.05) (-0.19)  (1.69)  (0.29)  (0.88)  (0.15)  0.962 0.006  0.913  0.252 
                   
Netherlands 217  0.571  -0.096  0.125  0.236  -0.313     
   (4.42)***  (-0.29)  (0.38)  (0.40)  (-0.56)      0.252 0.000  0.186  0.916 
 217  0.596  -0.042  0.092  1.239  -1.341  1.011  -1.177 
   (4.37)***  (-0.13)  (0.28)  (1.34)  (-1.47)  (1.22)  (-1.40)  0.829 0.000  0.166  0.875 
                   
Spain  613  -0.574 0.483  -0.740  -0.023 -0.103    
   (-3.36)***  (1.31)  (-2.52)**  (-0.04)  (-0.15)      0.126 0.005  0.574  0.073 
 613  -0.656  0.454  -0.890  0.385  -0.615  0.365  -1.442 






Table 2 (continued) 
Country Obs.  1 t R −   it L   ,1 it L −   it D   ,1 it D −   () it ZD   ,1 () it ZD −   Hansen 
b AR(1)
 b AR(2) 
b Wald 
b 
Sweden 232  1.825 -0.255  0.152 0.130 -0.016     
   (5.28)***  (-0.85)  (0.52)  (0.15)  (-0.02)     
0.999 0.568  0.111  0.685 
 232  1.921  -0.218  0.110  0.350  -0.221  0.401  -0.340 
   (3.99)***  (-0.69)  (0.35)  (0.48)  (-0.29)  (0.32)  (-0.28)  1.000 0.578  0.158  0.939 
                  
Switzerland  890 -1.075 -0.716 -1.046 -0.993 1.864     
    (-3.69)***  (-0.51) (-0.70) (-0.54) (1.17)      0.260 0.821  0.633  0.403 
 866  -1.253  -1.887  -0.155  0.077  1.437  -0.155  0.219 
   (-5.07)***  (-1.64)  (-0.16)  (0.05)  (1.08)  (-1.53)  (2.10)**  0.148 0.195  0.202  0.170 
                  
UK  509 0.488  -0.050 -0.976 -1.327 0.423     
    (1.32)  (-0.05) (-0.82) (-0.75) (0.31)      0.393 0.092  0.342  0.742 
 449  0.443  1.445  -2.230  -1.016  0.080  -0.030  -0.042 
    (1.36)  (0.60)  (-0.98) (-0.44) (0.04)  (-0.26) (-0.33) 0.551 0.052  0.569  0.875 
                  
USA 2040  0.700  1.264  0.600  -2.237  -4.072     
   (1.03)  (0.51)  (0.80)  (-0.51)  (-0.50)      0.310 0.525  0.864  0.833 
  2034  0.211 0.772 0.778 4.135 -5.301  -0.059  0.110 
    (0.66) (0.28) (0.37) (1.38) (-1.17)  (-0.77)  (1.12) 0.984 0.487  0.782  0.634 
                  
EU 6280  0.743  2.760  -0.739  -4.619  5.107     
    (1.25)  (0.95)  (-0.42) (-1.48) (1.55)      0.193 0.180  0.250  0.138 
 6279  0.125  2.716  -0.397  -3.146  1.354  -0.692  3.731 
    (0.48)  (1.48)  (-0.30) (-1.61) (0.76)  (-0.69) (1.35)  0.293 0.652  0.024  0.165 
                  
Notes: 
a. *** denotes coefficient significantly different from zero at the 1% significance level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and * significance at the 10% 
level. 
b. P-values.   
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